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I would only say that the more sociological history becomes, and the more
historical sociology becomes, the better for both.
Edward Hallett Carr
Charles Tilly (1929–2008) was one of the greatest sociologists of the second
half of the twentieth century. His incredible energy and creativity were a
powerful force in reviving the historical-comparative perspective in social
sciences and produced many new insights. Tilly has covered a very broad
range of subjects, from contentious behaviour, urbanization, proletar-
ianization, and state formation, to migration, democratization, and persis-
tent social inequality. His oeuvre is so vast – he wrote or edited dozens of
books and published hundreds of scholarly articles and countless book
reviews – that it has become a challenge to synthesize. In the following
article I will try to offer a comprehensive critique, in the hope that this will
further interest in and debate about the subject. First, I sketch Tilly’s
intellectual development since the late 1950s. Next, I discuss a few recurring
themes from his work that are of special interest to historians of the
working classes. I conclude with a critical review of Tilly’s achievements.
TILLY’S INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT, 1958–2008
Tilly’s academic career started with a remarkable volte face. In 1958
he obtained his Ph.D. degree at Harvard University for his thesis on
‘‘The Social Background of the Rebellion of 1793 in Southern Anjou’’. His
supervisors were the sociologists George C. Homans and Barrington
Moore, Jr, who, like Tilly’s previous mentor and ‘‘great teacher’’ Pitirim
* I am grateful to Rod Aya, Wim Blockmans, Marjolein ’t Hart, Mike Hanagan, Jan Lucassen,
Maarten Prak, Sid Tarrow, and Viviana Zelizer for critiquing previous versions of this essay.Sorokin,
1 both advocated a historicizing perspective.
2 While editing his
Ph.D. thesis for publication, Tilly had increasing misgivings about the simple,
unilinear development idea from his previous project. He later wrote:
In that imperfect doctoral dissertation, I had leaned heavily on conventional ideas
about modernization. The great counterrevolution of 1793 seemed to show the
typical reaction of a backward, unchanging, agrarian society to the unexpected
intrusion of modern political ways. As I said so, however, I began to doubt both
the generalization and its application to the Vende ´e. It is not well established that
‘‘backward’’ regions react to political change in reactionary ways.
3
The published edition of his Ph.D. thesis did not appear until six years
later and refuted his earlier theses. In this work, Tilly tried to provide a
contextualized explanation for the course of events. Entitled The Vende ´e,t h e
book marks the actual start of Tilly’s oeuvre as we know it, systematically
comparing two adjacent parts of France, of which one (the Val-Saumurois)
supported the French Revolution and the other (the Mauges) the counter-
revolution. In an effort to explain the differences, he seeks a process (urba-
nization, in this case) that is sufﬁciently general to encompass broader
patterns and does justice to the speciﬁcity of individual cases.
After completing his Ph.D. thesis, Tilly initially pursued two paths.
First, he evolved into a contemporary urbanist. While employed at MIT
and at Harvard’s Joint Center for Urban Studies he published on racial
segregation, housing projects, and related subjects.
4 The peak and
crowning glory of this research activity was the anthology, An Urban
1. Charles Tilly, Contentious Performances (Cambridge, 2008), p. 19.
2. See also Charles Tilly, ‘‘Homans, Humans, and History’’, in idem, As Sociology Meets History
(New York, 1981), pp. 85–94; idem, ‘‘George Caspar Homans and the Rest of Us’’, Theory and
Society, 19 (1990), pp. 261–268; idem, ‘‘In Memoriam Barrington Moore, Jr’’, Canadian Journal of
Sociology Online, January–February 2006. At the time, Homans and Moore were among the few
sociologists to adopt a historicizing approach. On the loss of historical perspective in US sociology
during those years, see David Zaret, ‘‘From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in
Modern Social Theory’’, American Journal of Sociology, 85 (1980), pp. 1180–1201.
3. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Preface to the Wiley Paperback Edition of The Vende ´e’’, in idem, The Vende ´e: A
Sociological Analysis of the Counterrevolution of 1793 (New York, 1967), pp. vii–xii, at vii.
4. Bruce M. Stave, ‘‘A Conversation with Charles Tilly: Urban History and Urban Sociology’’,
Journal of Urban History, 24 (1998), pp. 184–225, 197. See especially the following publications:
Charles Tilly and Arnold S. Feldman, ‘‘The Interaction of Social and Physical Space’’, American
Sociological Review, 25 (1960), pp. 877–884; Charles Tilly, ‘‘Occupational Rank and Grade of Resi-
dence in a Metropolis’’, American Journal of Sociology, 67 (1961), pp. 323–330; idem, Wagner Johnson,
and Barry Kay, Race and Residence in Wilmington (New York, 1965); Charles Tilly, ‘‘Anthropology
on the Town’’, Habitat, 10 (1967), pp. 20–25; idem, ‘‘Race and Migration to the American City’’, in
James Q. Wilson (ed.), The Metropolitan Enigma (Cambridge, MA, 1968); idem,‘ ‘ T h eF o r m so f
Urbanization’’, in Talcott Parsons (ed.), American Sociology (New York, 1969); idem, ‘‘Migration to
American Cities’’, in Daniel P. Moynihan (ed.), Toward a National Urban Policy (New York, 1970);
idem with Joe Feagin and Constance Williams, Subsidizing the Poor: A Boston Housing Experiment
(Lexington, MA, 1972); Charles Tilly (ed.), An Urban World (Boston, MA, 1974).
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From the mid-1970s, Tilly abandoned this intellectual course.
His historical studies were far more characteristic of his intellectual
development. He remained very interested in French social history after
completing his Ph.D. thesis and spent many years studying the course of
social change and contentious behaviour in that country in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, dealing extensively with quantitative aspects. From
around 1963, he worked with Edward Shorter and a few assistants (Lynn
Lees, David Hunt) to construct a database, which served as the foundation
for his widely publicized monograph Strikes in France, 1830–1968 (1974).
Deeply inﬂuenced by the events of May–June 1968, this book revolved
around a version of the modernization theory. The authors base their
approach, for example, on Alain Touraine’s forms of organization of produc-
tion (artisanal, mass production, science-sector production). Unlike Touraine,
however, they associated these with ‘‘historical periods’’ that coincide with
‘‘phases of technological change’’ and ‘‘phases of collective action’’.
5
Tilly remained interested in working on a team that gathered large
quantities of information to study contention.
6 In the 1970s and 1980s
three new databases were constructed under his aegis: (1) for France as
whole, highlighting Anjou, Burgundy, Flanders, the I ˆle de France, and
Languedoc, since 1600; (2) for London and its surroundings from 1758 to
1820; and (3) for Great Britain (England, Wales, Scotland) as a whole from
1828 to 1834.
7 The French material ultimately gave rise to the publication
The Contentious French in 1986. The British project was completed only
5. Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, Strikes in France, 1830–1968 (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 11, 15,
345. Mike Hanagan has accurately observed that Shorter and Tilly’s analysis relates closely to classi-
cal Marxism (Mike Hanagan, personal communication). In my view, however, classical Marxism in
turn embodied a version of the modernization theory. After all, all modernization theories have two
views in common: that an optimal course of development exists (with deviating from such a course
automatically leading to failure and stagnation), and that this course of development may be
described as a gradual transition from simple (‘‘traditional’’) to complex (‘‘modern’’) societies.
6. On the challenges and dangers inherent in this type of research, see Charles Tilly, ‘‘Com-
puting History’’, in idem, As Sociology Meets History (New York, 1981), pp. 53–83. French
historian Richard Cobb once wrote a hilarious pastiche of Tilly’s computer activities: ‘‘His-
torians in White Coats’’, Times Literary Supplement, 3 December 1971, pp. 1527–1528. (See also
Tilly, ‘‘Computing History’’, pp. 60–61.)
7. Charles Tilly, ‘‘GBS 1 GCL 5 ?’’, Connections, 10 (1987), pp. 94–105, 96. On the British
databases, see also R.A. Schweitzer, ‘‘A Study of Contentious Gatherings in Early Nineteenth-
Century Great Britain’’, Historical Methods, 12 (1979), pp. 1–4; R.A. Schweitzer and Steven C.
Simmons, ‘‘Interactive, Direct-Entry Approaches to Contentious Gathering Event Files’’, Social
Science History, 5 (1981), pp. 317–342; Charles Tilly and R.A. Schweitzer, ‘‘How London and its
Conﬂicts Changed Shape, 1758–1834,’’ Historical Methods, 5 (1981), pp. 67–77; Charles Tilly,
‘‘How (And, to Some Extent, Why) to Study British Contention’’, in idem, As Sociology Meets
History (New York, 1981); idem, ‘‘Britain Creates the Social Movement’’, in James Cronin and
Jonathan Schneer (eds), Social Conﬂict and the Political Order in Modern Britain (London,
1982); Tilly, Contentious Performances, pp. 35–41.
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology 239in 1995, culminating in the publication of Popular Contention in Great
Britain, 1758–1834.
8
Still, Tilly never became a pure cliometrician. He remained interested in
the qualitative aspects of historiography – albeit from a social-science per-
spective.
9 This approach dominated his work from the mid-1980s onward.
Tilly’s vast knowledge of French – and later also of British – social history
paved the way toward his more in-depth analyses. For a long time he was
interested primarily – but never exclusively – in Europe. The ﬁrst clear sign
of this interest was the anthology The Formation of National States
in Western Europe (1975); followed by Coercion, Capital, and European
States, AD 990–1990 (1990), European Revolutions, 1492–1992 (1993), and
Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000 (2004).
From the 1990s, Tilly progressively abandoned his geographic approach
and started to address ‘‘general’’ topics not associated with a speciﬁc
country or region. He also deviated somewhat from his usual empirical
style,
10 while seeming to shift his focus to the present and the very recent
past at the same time. Together with his son, the economist Chris Tilly, he
wrote Work Under Capitalism (1998). With Doug McAdam and Sidney
Tarrow he published Dynamics of Contention (2001); with Tarrow – but
without McAdam – Contentious Politics (2007); and as single author
Contentious Performances (2008). He also took on general sociological
issues, such as in Why? (2006) and in Credit and Blame (2008). The main
emphasis of his research, however, was the question of which circum-
stances were conducive to stable parliamentary democracies. Tilly
believed that three very different factors promoted democracy, namely
broader access to political participation; improved access to political
resources, and opportunities for different social groups; as well as cur-
tailing autonomous or arbitrary coercive power within the state and
outside. At ﬁrst he studied these factors separately – in Durable
Inequality (1998), The Politics of Collective Violence (2003), Trust and
Rule (2005), and Regimes and Repertoires (2006) – and subsequently
combined them in Democracy (2007), which was intended as a synthesis.
8. Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge, MA, 1986); idem, Popular Contention in
Great Britain, 1758–1834 (Cambridge, MA, 1995).
9. Already apparent in Charles Tilly, ‘‘In Defense of Jargon’’, Canadian Historical Association
Record, 1966, pp. 178–186, 186: ‘‘‘Measures’ do not necessarily mean numbers. [y] To be sure,
quantifying often helps by identifying silly assumptions, pointing up unsuspected relationships
and establishing whether purported differences are big enough to make a difference. But ‘sta-
tistical history’ and ‘computerized history’ do not necessarily stand closest to sociology.’’
10. This method was described as follows by his mentor George C. Homans: ‘‘He [Tilly] works
systematically with certain kinds of primary sources and exploits them with modern statistical
techniques. He can do this work only with the help of a team of well-integrated and well-
trained colleagues’’; Homans, ‘‘Fifty Years of Sociology’’, Annual Review of Sociology,1 2
(1986), pp. xiii–xxx, xxvii.
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1950s turns out to comprise a few ‘‘maelstroms’’ that were pivotal in all
his work. He kept revisiting these central themes, trying out an idea,
reformulating that idea, and so on and so forth, until a text emerged that
was more or less ‘‘ﬁnished’’. Once such a text was ready, Tilly generally
left the topic concerned as it was – although in some cases he might
reconsider it from a different perspective. This has led to a spiral-shaped
course that causes many partial overlaps between publications, making
some of his oeuvre seem somewhat repetitive.
Because a complete reconstruction of Tilly’s intellectual development
would span far too many pages, I will merely review the ‘‘ﬁnal products’’
in various ﬁelds here, although I will indicate brieﬂy the predecessors
to this ﬁnal product in cases where a major learning process took place.
I will address only Tilly’s historicizing writings.
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
Tilly was an exemplary scholar, who nearly always accounted for his
theoretical and empirical steps. His work reﬂects a few methodological
constants. First, he approached history from the perspective of a social
scientist, which meant, in Tilly’s own words, that: ‘‘the historian as social
scientist aims self-consciously at methodological rigor. He deﬁnes his
terms, states his hypothesis, clariﬁes his assumptions (in so far as he
himself is aware of them), and stipulates the criteria of proof’’.
11 Second, it
followed from this approach that Tilly never hesitated to correct himself
publicly, if he found that deﬁnitions, typologies, or hypotheses needed to
be revised. On this subject, he wrote in one of his most recent books:
‘‘Repeatedly I have thought I had identiﬁed an important principle,
proved a crucial point, or found a superior way of communicating an
argument only to discover that the principle suffered exceptions, the
proof failed to convince, or the new rhetoric caused misunderstandings I
had not anticipated.’’
12 Third, Tilly made extensive use of the comparative
method, which is ‘‘the systematic, standardized analysis of similar social
processes or phenomena (for example, slavery) in different settings
in order to develop and test general ideas of how those processes or
phenomena work’’.
13
11. David S. Landes and Charles Tilly (eds), History as Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
1971), p. 10.
12. Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge, 2003), p. xi.
13. Landes and Tilly, History as Social Science, p. 73. Elaborate reﬂections on this subject
appear in Tilly’s Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York, 1985); idem,
‘‘Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology,’’ Comparative Social Research, 16 (1997),
pp. 43–53.
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for the Times Literary Supplement once observed about Tilly0s ﬁrst book,
The Vende ´e:
Dr. Tilly, armed with a battery of compasses, ﬁeld glasses, range-ﬁnders, alti-
meters, so loaded down with apparatus that his prose limps heavily from one
demonstration to the next, eventually ends up more or less where other, less
prudent, more haphazard travellers have preceded him, after crashing impet-
uously through the bush, or simply following their eyes and noses. With
Dr. Tilly, we go the long way round; the author will not even let us start off at all
before he has offered us long disquisitions on ‘‘urbanization’’ in Kansas City,
and minute deﬁnitions of such difﬁcult words as ‘‘city,’’ ‘‘neighborhood,’’
‘‘commune,’’ ‘‘afﬁliation,’’ ‘‘parish.’’
14
The substance of Tilly’s work has consistently been historical-materi-
alist, not in the sense of orthodox Marxism (much of his writing in fact
reads like a critique of Marxism), but along the lines of an approach that
targets the logic of material interests. Understandably, therefore, since his
earliest publications, Tilly adopted a constructive-critical stand reﬂecting
Marx’s ideology. In retrospect, he regarded himself as part of the 1950s
‘‘Marxist-populist drive’’ that aimed to promote history from below.
15 In
1978 he described his view as ‘‘doggedly anti-Durkheimian, resolutely
pro-Marxian, but sometimes indulgent to Weber and sometimes reliant on
Mill’’.
16 In 1983 he argued that ‘‘if you want to observe the coalescence of
historical perception with theoretical penetration, you can do no better
than the work of Karl Marx’’.
17 Even around the turn of the century,
he still believed that Marxism could be innovated by discarding the
reductionism of the 1960s and by pursuing the course charted by E.P.
Thompson.
18 The main difference between Tilly’s approach and the
traditional Marxist one is that Tilly places far greater emphasis on state
formation, thereby attributing much more importance to political pro-
cesses that do not derive directly from class conﬂicts. In this respect he
adheres more to the tradition of Toqueville.
19
14. Richard Cobb, ‘‘The Counter-Revolt’’, Times Literary Supplement, 28 April 1966. Rep-
rinted in idem, A Second Identity: Essays on France and French History (London, 1969),
pp. 111–121 (quotation at pp. 118–119).
15. Charles Tilly, Stories, Identities, and Political Change (Lanham, MD, 2002), p. 5.
16. Idem, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA, 1978), p. 48.
17. Idem, ‘‘Karl Marx, Historian’’, Michigan Quarterly Review, 22 (1983), pp. 633–642, 642.
18. Stave, ‘‘Conversation with Charles Tilly’’, p. 204.
19. William H. Sewell, Jr, ‘‘Collective Violence and Collective Loyalties in France: Why the
French Revolution Made a Difference’’, Politics and Society, 18 (1990), pp. 527–552, 530.
Compare Tilly’s critique of the Marxist geographer, David Harvey, who ‘‘minimizes the
autonomous inﬂuence of states on urban processes and moves very quickly from the existence
of a capitalist interest to its realization in a particular feature of cities, without wasting much
effort on the process by which the interests generate their own realization’’; Charles Tilly,
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‘‘structural realism’’ and focused on ‘‘objective’’ (i.e. economic, military,
quantitative) aspects of social history. Only in the course of the 1980s did
he become more aware of the subjective angle of social processes and did
he start to transform his structural realism into a ‘‘relational realism’’
integrating structural and cultural elements. In an interview in 1998 he
explained: ‘‘One of my major intellectual projects of the last decade or
so has been to build a more adequate account of identity, agency, and
culture.’’
20
While thinking about these issues, he elaborated an approach that was
vaguely discernible in his earlier work. On the one hand, Tilly objected
early on to the structural functionalism of Talcott Parsons and others,
which had been the dominant movement in American sociology until
well into the 1960s. Tilly saw no merit in this approach or in similar
‘‘Durkheimian theories’’, because they ‘‘build on a conception of a vague
social unit called a society’’, and consequently not only hide ‘‘the effective
human actors’’ but depersonalize the historical process as well.
21 After the
rational-choice model had gained inﬂuence in the 1980s, Tilly resisted that
as well, arguing that human behaviour always includes an ‘‘erratic’’ aspect
and is therefore impossible to interpret according to a methodological-
individualist approach.
22
Tilly refused to use society or individuals as such as a unit of analysis.
Instead, in keeping with the network theoretician Harrison White, he
opted for the social relations between social sites – individuals, as well as
households, neighbourhoods, and organizations. In a relational analysis,
social inequality, for example, is examined not as the difference between
two otherwise unrelated social positions but as a feature of the relation-
ship between these positions. Accordingly, a boundary between the social
‘‘What’s Left of the City?’’, Journal of Urban History, 14 (1988), pp. 394–398, 395. Fred Block’s
state theory seems to relate perfectly to Tilly’s approach. See e.g. Fred Block, ‘‘Beyond Relative
Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects’’, The Socialist Register, 17 (1980), pp.
227–242. Arthur Stinchcombe noted the similarities – see his ‘‘Autonomy Makes the State More
Predictable’’, Contemporary Sociology, 20 (1991), pp. 178–179 – although, to my knowledge,
Tilly never mentioned this himself.
20. Stave, ‘‘Conversation with Charles Tilly’’, p. 203. This project ﬁrst became visible in the
second half of the 1970s, when Tilly introduced the ‘‘repertoire of contention’’ concept, on
which I will elaborate later in this article.
21. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Proletarianization: Theory and Research’’, in idem, As Sociology Meets
History, pp. 187–188.
22. Charles Tilly, Durable Inequality (Berkeley, CA, 1998), p. 20; idem, ‘‘Models and Realities
of Popular Collective Action’’, Social Research, 52 (1985), pp. 717–747; idem, ‘‘Invisible
Elbow’’, Sociological Forum, 11 (1996), pp. 589–601; idem, ‘‘Lullaby, Chorale, or Hurdy-Gurdy
Tune?’’, in Roger Gould (ed.), The Rational-Choice Controversy in Historical Sociology
(Chicago, IL, 2001).
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who are ‘‘they’’? Such boundary construction is an ongoing process from
which shifting identities keep emerging.
23
For a long time Tilly was a proponent of modernization theory, albeit
frequently with reservations. In 1972, for example, he wrote that the
modernization concept was ‘‘too big and slippery for deft manipula-
tion’’,
24 while arguing at the same time that the designation comprised
multiple, partially contradictory processes. The modernization idea led to
a unilinear image of history, in which stages succeeded one another,
basically out of ‘‘necessity’’. In 1990 Tilly criticized his The Formation of
National States in Western Europe from 1975 as
[y] a new unilinear story [y] running from war to extraction and repression to
state formation [y]. We continued, more or less unthinkingly, to assume that
European states followed one main path, the one marked by Britain, France,
and Brandenburg-Prussia, and that the experiences of other states constituted
attenuated or failed versions of the same processes. That was wrong.
25
The transition from a modernization approach to a non-unilinear
approach ultimately led to a focus on mechanisms, which in combination
produce various outcomes. Very early on, Tilly objected to what he
described as ‘‘Unnatural History’’:
[y] a case in point is a recurrent article in the American Journal of Sociology,
published with insigniﬁcant variations in title, authorship and vocabulary,
which asserts by means of a handful of examples that there is a single underlying
Process of Revolution. At ﬁrst it looks like natural history, in the sense that it
portrays the standard setting and life cycle of a distinct species of event. Closer
inspection usually shows that the unnatural historian has begged the question
by assuming that his identiﬁcation of common sequences within the events
singled out ipso facto conﬁrms that they belong to the same species y as if
declaring that a man’s life has a beginning, a middle and an end, then that a paper
before a learned society has a beginning, a middle and (thank goodness) an end
established that men’s lives and papers before learned societies came from the
same species.
26
23. Charles Tilly, Stories, Identities, and Political Change; idem, ‘‘Social Boundary Mechan-
isms’’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34 (2004), pp. 211–236.
24. Charles Tilly, ‘‘The Modernization of Political Conﬂict in France’’, in Edward B. Harvey
(ed.), Perspectives on Modernization: Essays in Memory of Ian Weinberg (Toronto, 1972),
pp. 51–95, 51.
25. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990 (Oxford, 1990), p. 12.
26. Tilly, ‘‘In Defense of Jargon’’, pp. 182–183. This idea was later explained in James Rule and
Charles Tilly, ‘‘1830 and the Unnatural History of Revolution’’, Journal of Social Issues,2 8
(1972), pp. 49–76. Tilly consistently supported this view. See e.g. his ‘‘To Explain Political
Processes’’, American Journal of Sociology, 100 (1995), pp. 1594–1610, 1597; idem, Explaining
Social Processes (Boulder, CO, 2008), ch. 7.
244 Marcel van der LindenOver time, Tilly countered such a covering-law approach increasingly
with a ‘‘mechanismic’’ approach, such as the one theoretically devised
since the late 1980s by Jon Elster, Arthur Stinchcombe, and others.
27
His objective was to break complex historical sequences down into events
or episodes, such as social movements, revolutions, or democratic transi-
tions, and subsequently to investigate which ‘‘robust mechanisms of
relatively general scope’’ ﬁgured in the course of these episodes. This
meant that history no longer needed to be perceived as the outcome
of ‘‘general historical patterns’’ but could be interpreted as a chain of
contingent mechanisms.
28
STATE-BUILDING AND CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT
Virtually from the outset, Tilly dealt with general trends in European
history since the Middle Ages. Although he reﬁned his analysis con-
siderably over time, he consistently assumed that two master processes
had a decisive inﬂuence, whether directly or indirectly: capital accumu-
lation and state-building. Neither process was linear. Both included crises,
reversals, and digressions. Neither one carried more historical weight than
the other; they were autonomous developments that continuously exerted
a reciprocal inﬂuence. Wars were endemic in the European system of
states;
29 rulers relied increasingly on capitalists to ﬁnance the organization
of violence, while capitalists needed states as guarantors of private
property.
Into the eighteenth century, European states were either very small
units, such as port cities with their hinterlands, or they were composed of
highly autonomous segments. As a result, into the eighteenth or nine-
teenth centuries, rulers depended on compliance from regional power
27. Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge, 1989); Arthur Stinchcombe,
‘‘The Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing about Mechanisms in Social Science’’, Philoso-
phy of the Social Sciences, 21 (1991), pp. 367–388; Mario Bunge, ‘‘Mechanism and Explanation’’,
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 27 (1997), pp. 410–465; Peter Hedstro ¨m and Richard Swedberg
(eds), Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge, 1998). See also
the reﬂections in John Gerring, ‘‘The Mechanismic Worldview: Thinking Inside the Box’’,
British Journal of Political Science, 38 (2007), pp. 161–179.
28. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Mechanisms in Political Processes’’, Annual Review of Political Science,4
(2001), pp. 21–41.
29. Tilly believed that a war-provoking logic was inherent in state-making in Europe:
‘‘everyone who controlled substantial coercive means tried to maintain a secure area within
which he could enjoy the returns from coercion, plus a fortiﬁed buffer zone, possible run at a
loss, to protect the secure area. Police or their equivalent deployed force in the secure area,
while armies patrolled the buffer zone and ventured outside it’’; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and
European States, pp. 70–71. This included an expansionist trend, which, whenever adjacent
states followed the same logic, inevitably led to war, and which, to my knowledge, Tilly never
made a serious effort to explain.
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states were extremely heterogeneous in a linguistic, cultural, and legal
sense.
30 Tilly described this type of state structure as indirect rule:
Indirect rule included a wide range of social arrangements: the tribute-taking
relation of the sultan’s court to local headmen in the Ottoman Empire, the
holding of judicial, economic, and military power by great landlords in Poland,
reliance on a faithful clergy in Sweden, concession of an enormous role in parish
and county administration to English gentry and clergy justices of the peace,
and survival of the Dutch Republic as a federation of ﬁercely competitive
municipalities and their dependencies.
31
These states expanded gradually in size, while dwindling in number. In
around 1500 Europe had about 500 autonomous political entities, aver-
aging about 3,800 square miles (6,115km
2) in size, with an average
population of 124,000. Four centuries later, 30 states remained, averaging
63,000 square miles (101,389km
2) in size, with an average population of
7.7 million.
32 Although dynastic politics and the formation of federations
were in part responsible for this concentration, wars were, in Tilly’s view,
the driving force behind the state-building process for a long time, as
these ‘‘provided the chief occasions on which states expanded, con-
solidated, and created new forms of political organization’’.
33 The coer-
cive core of the emerging states enabled them to deactivate all competing
organizations.
34 The extent to which war-making inﬂuenced the state
structure depended on the interaction between the type of war concerned,
the nature of the economic relationships, and the ﬁscal strategy. To
achieve larger concentrations of capital and coercive means, various paths
could be taken. A somewhat simpliﬁed version of these paths would be:
(a) the coercion-rich and capital-poor path of e.g. Poland and Russia;
(b) the coercion-poor and capital-rich path of e.g. the Netherlands; and
30. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Democracy is a Lake’’, in George Reid Andrews and Herrick Chapman
(eds), The Social Construction of Democracy, 1870–1990 (New York [etc.], 1995).
31. Charles Tilly, ‘‘State and Counterrevolution in France’’, Social Research, 56 (1989),
pp. 71–97, 74.
32. Charles Tilly, ‘‘The Geography of European Statemaking and Capitalism Since 1500’’, in
Eugene D. Genovese and Leonard Hochberg (eds), Geographic Perspectives in History (Oxford
[etc.], 1989), pp. 172–173.
33. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, p. 70; idem, ‘‘Cities and States in Europe’’,
Theory and Society, 18 (1989), pp. 563–584, 568.
34. There are four types of state-controlled violence: (1) war-making; (2) state-making, i.e.
deactivating or neutralizing domestic rivals; (3) protection, i.e. deactivating or neutralizing of
the enemies of clients; and (4) extraction, i.e. obtaining the means for the ﬁrst three activities to
be performed; Charles Tilly, ‘‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’’, in Peter
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In
(Cambridge, 1985); Tilly, ‘‘Geography of European Statemaking’’, pp. 166–167.
246 Marcel van der Linden(c) a ‘‘middle path’’ where coercion and capital were about equally sig-
niﬁcant, such as in France and Britain.
35
In the period 1750–1850 the internal structure of the European states
changed drastically. Segmentation made way for consolidation. Rulers gained
direct control of large, heterogeneous areas. They built reinforcements along
the borders and disarmed individual citizens and rival power-holders, in part
by dismantling castles, disbanding private armies, controlling arms produc-
tion, prohibiting duels, and conﬁscating weapons. Parallel to this effort, they
set up a proactive police force dedicated to preventing unlawful acts,
including unlawful collective action, in part through patrolling and surveil-
lance, rather than punishing criminals ostentatiously and publicly after the
fact. In addition, rulers imposed uniform military, legislative, judicial, ﬁscal,
monetary, and cultural systems on their populations. No longer did they stay
in touch with their subjects via authoritarian, privileged intermediaries.
Instead, they intervened directly in their daily lives.
36 The result was a shift
from indirect to direct rule. Around 1850,
States had substituted their own ofﬁcials for the patrons of old, tax farming and
similar practices had almost vanished, elected legislatures connected the more
substantial citizens to the national government, and census-takers brought royal
inquiries to individual households, as national bureaucracies attempted to
monitor and regulate whole countries and all their residents.
37
Once again, war-making was the main cause of the changes. As the size
and power of states grew, wars became increasingly costly and destructive.
The armies of mercenaries that had dominated European warfare from the
ﬁfteenth until the seventeenth centuries became too expensive and were
replaced by domestically recruited standing armies of conscripts and
volunteers, while the burden of taxation was raised simultaneously. This
trend and the resulting resistance led complementary organizations to be set
up (treasuries, tax ofﬁces, conscription mechanisms) and to perform inter-
ventions directly palpable in the local communities. To be accepted by the
population, states had to make concessions and grant ordinary people
r e w a r d sa n dr i g h t st ow h i c ht h e yh a dn o tb e e ne n t i t l e di nt h ep a s t .
The consolidation of states thus coincided with a dual process of cir-
cumscription and central control. Circumscription means that states greatly
tightened their control over the resources on their territory: movements of
capital, goods, people, and ideas started to be regulated. Central control
means that states devised a system of instruments for central information
processing and surveillance (censuses, bureaus of statistics, inspectorates,
35. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States.
36. Charles Tilly, ‘‘The Time of States’’, Social Research, 61 (1994), pp. 269–295, 279; idem,
‘‘Futures of European States’’, Social Research, 59 (1992), pp. 705–717, 708.
37. Tilly, ‘‘State and Counterrevolution in France’’, p. 75.
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology 247police forces) and started to interfere in infrastructure, working conditions,
education, agriculture methods, and many other matters. Circumscription
and central control had a clear cultural connotation, in that they were con-
ducive to a measure of cultural homogenization within the state borders.
Whereas in non-consolidated segmented states, such as the Hapsburg
Empire, all different religions and languages were acknowledged by the state
forces, consolidating states promoted the establishment of an ofﬁcial national
language and a standardized interpretation of the national past via schools,
monuments, museums, and other media. The emerging nationalism appeared
in two manifestations. Wherever the state construed a speciﬁc ethnic group
as ‘‘state-supporting,’’ the resulting state-led nationalism aimed to have all
residents of the state adopt speciﬁc cultural forms. And wherever this new
nationalism denied or suppressed the identity of some groups, state-seeking
nationalism might materialize, embodying the desire of some set of people to
acquire their own state, where they celebrate their own distinctive, national
culture. State-led nationalism thus stimulates state-seeking nationalism.
Consolidation of states coincided with the creation of new, collective
identities and redeﬁnition, legitimation, or in fact de-legitimation, of old,
collective identities – a process that did not actually give rise to fully
homogeneous states anywhere.
38
Tilly devoted considerably less attention to the capital-formation process
than to the state-building one. He was deeply inﬂuenced by the proto-
industrialization studies of the 1970s by Franklin Mendel and others.
39 Tilly
argued that the European economy had also evolved in two stages. During
the ﬁrst stage, from 1500 to 1800, accumulation had occurred decentrally.
Merchant capital was mobile and more likely to shift to locations where
labour was available than vice versa. Economic growth was achieved via the
multiplication of small, widely dispersed production units connected with
one another by merchants via a putting-out system. The result was ‘‘a ﬁnely
articulated hierarchy of markets from local to international, with local
markets that corresponded to the geography of labor’’.
40
38. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, p. 70; idem, ‘‘State and Counterrevolution in
France’’, p. 76; idem, ‘‘Futures of European States’’, pp. 708–711; idem, ‘‘Time of States’’, p. 287;
idem, Durable Inequality, pp. 170–181. A political identity comprises four elements, according
to Tilly: (1) boundaries that separate insiders from outsiders; (2) social relations across the
boundaries; (3) social relations within the boundaries; and (4) shared stories that justify the
boundaries. See Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence, p. 32. And on the nationalism issue:
Charles Tilly, ‘‘National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of Us’’, Daedalus, 122 (1993),
pp. 29–36; idem, ‘‘The State of Nationalism’’, Critical Review, 10 (1996), pp. 299–306.
39. See especially Franklin Mendels, ‘‘Proto-Industrialization: The First Phase of Indus-
trialization’’, Journal of Economic History, 32 (1972), pp. 241–261.
40. Tilly, ‘‘Geography of European Statemaking’’, p. 170; idem, ‘‘Flows of Capital and Forms of
Industry in Europe, 1500–1900’’, Theory and Society, 12 (1983), pp. 123–142, 125, 132.
248 Marcel van der LindenIn the nineteenth and twentieth centuries accumulation patterns
changed. Capital concentration grew and affected labour processes far
more directly, as labour ﬂocked increasingly to the locations of such
capital. As a consequence, industrial production and services came to be
concentrated in cities, while the countryside de-industrialized in many
regions and specialized in agriculture and livestock breeding. What was
known as the Industrial Revolution was merely an ‘‘illusion’’, caused by




Like Lewis Mumford, Tilly regarded the city as the combined outcome of
state-building and capital-formation.
42 In The Vende ´e he observed that
urbanization was a prominent force. Urbanization is regarded there as the
outcome of two developments, namely market expansion, requiring on
the one hand, ‘‘communication, specialists in coordination, and penetra-
tion of existing, traditional forms of social organization’’, and on the other
hand, state centralization, which ‘‘encourages the rise of specialists in
political coordination and manipulation, calls for more frequent exchan-
ges of orders and information, draws formerly isolated regions and
communities into greater contact with decision-making centers, and into
greater dependence upon them’’.
43 Urbanization, however, was not only
a dependent variable but in turn promoted state-building and capital-
formation as well. Especially in the period 1500–1800, good-sized cities
relied on cash crops from the surrounding countryside. Commercial
agriculture promoted the prosperity of merchants and small and medium-
sized farmers, which in turn reduced the leverage of the great landlords,
also with respect to the monarchs.
44
While the number of European states diminished since 1500, cities
increased in both number and size. This divergence led the number of
large cities in each state to grow considerably and caused a shift in ﬁscal
strategies, demands for services, and political relationships. State
bureaucracies expanded, land taxes became less signiﬁcant, and – from
the mid-eighteenth century onwards – forms of collective action and
surveillance changed.
45 Urbanization was paralleled by changes in the
nature of the countryside. The transition from subsistence polyculture
41. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Retrieving European Lives’’, in Olivier Zunz (ed.), Reliving the Past: The
Worlds of Social History (Chapel Hill, NC, 1985), p. 43.
42. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Since Gilgamesh’’, Social Research, 53 (1986), pp. 391–410, 401.
43. Tilly, Vende ´e, pp. 17–18.
44. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, pp. 48–49.
45. Tilly, ‘‘Geography of European Statemaking’’, p. 174.
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology 249to cultivation of cash crops for the urban market had major social
ramiﬁcations:
The producer binds himself to distant and nameless consumers, adopts new
standards for evaluating his work, requires for his yearly operation information
from a much wider range of sources than before, and depends on market spe-
cialists both as sources of commodities he now needs and as a means for the sale
of the cash crops he now produces.
46
By 1500–1800, geographic mobility was already substantial, with annual
migration rates of 10 per cent and higher, although this migration was often
local and took place between nearby villages or to a city in the surroundings.
Such migration was also promoted by the natural demographic decline
occurring in nearly all European cities during the early modern period: deaths
outnumbered births. Even in demographically stagnating cities, demand for
migrants from nearby villages and towns persisted. Only from the nineteenth
century onward was this pattern replaced by two other movements, namely
extra-continental migration (an estimated 50 million people, mostly prole-
tarians, between 1800 and World War I) and short-distance commuting.
47
In his analyses of migration processes Tilly emphasized that the effective
units tended to be sending and receiving social networks – in some cases
related to one another – rather than individuals and households. After
looking for answers to two questions, namely how long migrants left their
sending area, and how deﬁnitive their rift with the sending network was,
Tilly devised multiple typologies of migration patterns over the years. Three
forms keep resurfacing in his publications: (1) in circular migration people
return to their area of origin after a clearly circumscribed interval (seasonal
work on harvests, etc.); (2) chain migration entails extended displacements
with active support from related sending and receiving networks; and (3) in
career migration persons or households move more or less permanently,
because large structures (ﬁrms, governments, armies) offer them opportu-
nities for upward social mobility. Other patterns identiﬁed by Tilly in some
cases include colonizing migration (which entails integral transfer elsewhere
of a segment of a sending network) and coerced migration, such as the slave
trade, for example, in which all ties between migrants and sending network
are severed. Some of these patterns overlap, and a few (e.g. career migration)
are numerically less signiﬁcant than others.
48
46. Tilly, Vende ´e, p. 18.
47. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Demographic Origins of the European Proletariat’’, in David Levine (ed.),
Proletarianization and Family History (Orlando, FL, 1984), pp. 45–46; idem, ‘‘Migration in
European History’’, in William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams (eds), Human Migration:
Patterns and Policies (Bloomington, IN [etc.], 1978), pp. 51–52.
48. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Transplanted Networks’’, in Virginia Yans-McLauglin (ed.), Immigration
Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics (New York, 1990); idem, Durable Inequality,
pp. 163–169; idem, ‘‘Migration in Modern European History’’; idem, ‘‘Trust Networks in
250 Marcel van der LindenProletarianization is, according to Tilly’s description, ‘‘the declining
control of households over their own means of production, and the
increasing dependence of those households on the sale of their labor
power’’.
49 Proletarianization is caused by capital-formation and indirectly
by state-building as well. The two causes of this process were: (1) states
protected the capital, because it beneﬁted them ﬁnancially and thus
promoted auspicious accumulation; and (2) state-building coincided with
rising taxation that forced the population to engage in market transac-
tions, as this was the only way they could earn money to fulﬁl their
obligation toward the state.
50
Proletarianization in Europe took place in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage
(until roughly 1800) the majority of the proletariat was in the countryside.
Because of de-central capital-formation and the concurrent cottage
industry in rural areas, plus the impoverishment of parts of the agrarian
population, even in Britain, the heartland of the so-called Industrial
Revolution, relatively more proletarians lived in the countryside than in
the cities for a long time. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when
capital became concentrated in the cities, and the countryside de-indus-
trialized, the relative share of rural proletarians declined, and city workers
became concentrated in larger production units.
51
In an audacious attempt to quantify the pace of this proletarianization
in Europe, Tilly generalized the data that Karlheinz Blaschke had found
for the Kingdom of Saxony to apply to the entire continent (not including
Turkey and Russia).
52 His estimate is shown in Table 1 above.
53
Table 1. Population growth and proletarianization in Europe, 1500–1900
(in millions)
1500 1800 1900
Total population 56 150 285
Non-proletarians 39 50 85
Proletarians in cities 1 10 75
Rural proletarians 16 90 125
Transnational Migration’’, Sociological Forum, 22 (2007), pp. 3–25. The importance of networks
(professions, kin groups) for migrants was previously highlighted in Charles Tilly and C.
Harold Brown, ‘‘On Uprooting, Kinship, and the Auspices of Migration’’, International Journal
of Comparative Sociology, 7 (1967), pp. 139–164.
49. Tilly, Contentious French,p .5 ;idem, ‘‘Proletarianization’’, pp. 179–181.
50. Charles Tilly, ‘‘States, Taxes, and Proletarians’’, in idem, As Sociology Meets History, p. 202.
51. Tilly, ‘‘Since Gilgamesh’’, p. 408.
52. Karlheinz Blaschke, Bevo ¨lkerungsgeschichte von Sachsen bis zur industriellen Revolution
(Weimar, 1967).
53. Tilly, ‘‘States, Taxes, and Proletarians’’, p. 198; idem, ‘‘Demographic Origins of the
European Proletariat’’, p. 36; idem, Trust and Rule, p. 121.
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology 251A population’s growth or decline is always the combined result of three
mutually dependent factors: natural increase (births minus deaths), social
mobility (accessions to the population minus exits from the population),
and net migration (immigration minus emigration). Tilly argued that in
Europe natural increase (children of proletarians become proletarians
as well) was the most important factor explaining proletarianization,
especially after 1800. While the limited capital of their households forced
artisans and peasants to marry fairly late and to limit family size, prole-
tarians married early and had a high fertility rate: the more ‘‘hands’’, the
higher their income.
54 Tilly proposed the following hypothesis:
[y] on the average, proletarians responded to economic expansion with greater
declines in mortality and greater increases in fertility than nonproletarians did
and responded to economic contraction with greater increases in mortality but
no greater declines in fertility than nonproletarians did. The consequence was a
disproportionate natural increase of proletarians in good times, not completely
compensated by the natural decrease of bad times.
55
Relying on some ‘‘strong guesses’’, Tilly provided very rough estimates
of demographic growth rates (Table 2 above).
56 Tilly’s hypothesis
clearly differs from the view often defended – which we have already
observed in Marx’s work and elsewhere – that the most important com-
ponent of the proletariat’s growth was mobility from non-proletarian to
proletarian positions. This hypothesis has been subject to considerable
criticism.
57
Table 2. Some components of European demographic growth (annual







1500–1800 0.25 0.5 0.4
1800–1900 0.6 0.9 0.1
54. Tilly, ‘‘Demographic Origins’’, pp. 40–43, 52. This is a generalization of the well-known
thesis of Franklin Mendels about the demographics of proto-industries. Tilly has speculated
elsewhere as well about the end of the high proletarian fertility rates. At a certain point
embourgeoisement occurs: ‘‘the acquisition of property and the investment in children’s futures
among all classes of the population, in this argument, checks fertility more decisively than ever
before’’; Charles Tilly, ‘‘Questions and Conclusions’’, in idem (ed.), Historical Studies of
Changing Fertility (Princeton, NJ, 1978), pp. 349–350.
55. Tilly, ‘‘Demographic Origins’’, p. 39.
56. Ibid., p. 47.
57. Wally Seccombe, A Millennium of Family Change: Feudalism to Capitalism in North-
western Europe (London [etc.], 1992), called Tilly’s analysis ‘‘pathbreaking’’ (p. 168) but rejected
it nonetheless. ‘‘He [Tilly] proposes no change in proletarian vital rates coincident with the
252 Marcel van der LindenIn a few publications, among which the most important is Work Under
Capitalism, and which Tilly wrote together with his son Chris, he
attempted to understand the labour relationships of wage earners. Con-
trary to neoclassical economists alleging that market forces and technol-
ogy determine the nature of work, he advocated a far broader approach
that took into account social context and connections. Focusing on ‘‘work
contracts’’ – which he interpreted as ‘‘the prescribed relations’’ between
workers and other parties involved in their work – Tilly devised a model
for labour relations under capitalism that accommodated historical and
cultural variations, emphasizing the three main types of work incentives:
coercion (threats to inﬂict harm), compensation (wages, tips, bonuses,
etc.), and commitment (invocation of solidarity).
58
COLLECTIVE CLAIM-MAKING
Both state-building and capital-formation entail fundamental conﬂicts
that generate open contention. State-building coincided with three types
of conﬂicts: (1) growing states drew heavily on the resources of their
subject populations (conscription, taxation), which led to resistance; (2)
consolidating states competed with great lords for support from these
same populations; and (3) groups within the domain of the states vied for
resources, rewards, etc. under the state’s control. Capital-formation added
three other types of conﬂicts: (4) the opposition of capital and labour, i.e.
between the owners of the production means and those who worked for
them; (5) the struggle between capitalists and others enforcing claims to
land, labour, and other resources; and (6) competition among capitalists.
These conﬂicts would lead several parts of the population to claim
property, provisions, and freedom. The exact course of state-building and
capital-formation largely determined timing, social foundation, form, and
outcomes of such collective claims. ‘‘Massive peasant rebellions, for
example, occurred chieﬂy in bulky, poorly capitalized, coercion-intensive
states, while the struggles of guilds for power and privilege concentrated
in the territories of intense commercial capitalism and capitalized
states.’’
59
overall acceleration of the mid eighteenth century, but a later quickening in the nineteenth
century. It seems more likely that the ranks of wage-earners were swelled primarily by the
extrusion of rural youth from other classes. While proletarian households would lead the vital
revolution in the second half of the eighteenth century, their indigenous growth rates were
similar to, or smaller than, those of other classes before 1750’’ (p. 294). Seccombe’s evidence,
however, is ‘‘fragmentary and indirect’’ (ibid.).
58. Chris Tilly and Charles Tilly, Work Under Capitalism (Boulder, CO, 1998), pp. 74–75,
86–92. Compare Tilly, Durable Inequality, pp. 110–113.
59. Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492–1992 (Oxford, 1993), pp. 37–38; idem,
‘‘Retrieving European Lives’’, pp. 40–41; idem, Contentious French, pp. 6–7.
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology 253Once collective claims are enforced by the public authorities (state
agents) these claims turn into rights. Claims that are not enforced or are
enforced by parties other than the public authorities (e.g. by hired squads
of thugs) are therefore not rights.
60 To enforce claims, a state requires a
certain governmental capacity, which means that governmental actions
should be capable of affecting ‘‘distributions and deployments of people,
activities, and resources within the government’s territory’’.
61
Tilly took greater interest in conﬂicts arising from state-building than
in those attributable to capital-formation; even in his studies about strike
behaviour, he focuses on the political aspect.
62 His basic assumption was
that within a population several groups tried to inﬂuence the government.
On the one hand, there are the contenders, who routinely claim support
from the government in the form of resources or actions; they pertain to
the polity, i.e. the set of all successful contenders. On the other hand, there
are the challengers, who even though they request support from the
government like the contenders do not routinely receive it. Contenders
are therefore insiders, while challengers are outsiders.
Contenders cannot expect to remain part of the polity automatically.
Their success depends on their ability to mobilize a sufﬁciently large
following or clientele, possibly through coercion tactics. If eventually
their efforts cease to be effective, they are excluded from the polity. As the
changes in composition of the polity accelerate, the contestations, which
in some cases are more and in other cases less violent, will broaden.
Conﬂicts occur especially between contenders, between contenders and
60. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Where Do Rights Come From?’’, in idem, Stories, Identities, and Political
Change (Lanham, MD, 2002), p. 124; idem, ‘‘Globalization Threatens Labor’s Rights’’, Inter-
national Labor and Working-Class History, 47 (1995), pp. 1–23.
61. Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires (Chicago, IL, 2006), p. 23.
62. Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, Strikes in France, 1830–1960 (Cambridge, 1974) mainly
defended two statements: (1) the French waves of strikes (1833, 1840, 1869–1870, 1893,
1899–1900, 1906, 1919–1920, 1936, 1947–1949, 1953) consistently represented extensions of
normal processes of political participation – they were primarily intended not as ‘‘real tests of
economic strength’’, but as ‘‘symbolic displays of political energy and resoluteness’’, targeting
the public authorities; and (2) these waves of strikes never erupted completely spontaneously
but made sense only as the outcome of prior organizational forms, i.e. ‘‘the availability of a
structure which identiﬁes, accumulates and communicates grievances on the one hand, and
facilitates collective action on the other’’ (pp. 284 and 343). Both conclusions were vehemently
rejected by French authors. See earlier reactions from Michelle Perrot (pp. 888–891) and Claude
Durant (pp. 891–894) to a pre-publication by Charles Tilly and Edward Shorter, ‘‘Les vagues de
gre `ves en France’’, Annales, ESC, New Series, 28 (1973), pp. 857–887. Jacques Rancie `re
expressed a point of view diametrically opposed to that of Tilly, suggesting that ‘‘militant
activity is perhaps inversely proportional to the organic cohesion of the trade, the strength of
the organization, and the ideology of the group’’; Jacques Rancie `re, ‘‘The Myth of the Artisan:
Critical Reﬂections on a Category of Social History’’, in Steven L. Kaplan and Cynthia J.
Koepp (eds), Work in France: Representation, Meaning, Organization, and Practice (Ithaca, NY,
1986), p. 321.
254 Marcel van der Lindenchallengers, and between challengers and agents of the state (police,
army), and less frequently between challengers or between contenders
and state agents. Sometimes such conﬂicts will cause a polity to break up
into more than one. If such a condition continues for an extended period,
it is a ‘‘revolt’’ or a ‘‘civil war’’, which may lead to permanent division of a
territory into two or more autonomous territories. Constituting a new
single polity following a period of fragmentation means, according to
Tilly, that a revolution has taken place.
The complex of claim-making, as well as the emergence, the logic, and the
consequences thereof, are pivotal in Tilly’s oeuvre. The questions that
probably preoccupied Tilly the most during his lifetime are: ‘‘Under what
conditions will normally apathetic, frightened, or disorganized people
explode into the streets, put down their tools, or mount the barricades?
How do different actors and identities appear and transform in episodes of
contention? Finally, what kind of trajectories do these processes follow?’’
63
Tilly became convinced very early on that protest did not erupt out of
the blue from discontent about rampant unemployment and high food
prices. He objected vehemently to what he called ‘‘the Hydraulic Model’’,
which holds that protest ensues almost automatically when people fall on
hard times: ‘‘hardship increases, pressure builds up, the vessel bursts. The
angry individual acts as a reservoir of resentment, a conduit of tension, a
boiler of fury’’.
64 In response, Tilly tried to discover rationality in col-
lective action. One of his basic principles was that the nature of con-
tentious politics changes as the most important addressee (the state)
changes character, while at the same time the state changes because of
contentious politics as well. Adequately conceptualizing this correlation
proved particularly difﬁcult. During the ﬁrst few decades Tilly remained
captivated by the modernization idea and invested enormous intellectual
energy trying to relativize this mindset. In the 1960s and 1970s – tempted
by the work of Eric Hobsbawm and George Rude ´
65 – he successively
used several schemata based on three evolutionist stages. First, he iden-
tiﬁed ‘‘primitive’’, ‘‘reactionary’’, and ‘‘modern’’ collective violence. He
believed that these stages paralleled centralization of state power: ﬁrst,
local, small-scale forms of protest dominated; as the power of the state
increased, resistance focused on preserving established rights; ﬁnally,
63. Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge,
2001), p. 38.
64. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Food Supply and Public Order in Modern Europe’’, in: idem (ed.), The
Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ, 1975), pp. 390–392. This is
strikingly similar to E.P. Thompson’s criticism of the ‘‘spasmodic school’’. See Edward P.
Thompson, ‘‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’’, Past and
Present, 50 (1971), pp. 77–78.
65. Tilly, Stories, Identities, and Political Change,p .5 .
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology 255there was the resistance that accepted the existence of centralized states
and pursued expansion of rights.
66 A few years afterwards, he introduced
another trio denoting the claims of the protest, distinguishing ‘‘competi-
tive’’, ‘‘proactive’’, and ‘‘reactive’’ action.
67
Figure 1. Charles Tilly and Louise Audino Tilly at the 1994 American Historical Association in
San Francisco after Louise had delivered her presidential address. Louise Tilly became widely
respected for her historical studies on collective action, women, and family life. Together from
the 1950s till the mid-1990s, the Tillys were not only a couple, but also a scholarly team,
teaching together and pursuing a number of joint research projects.
Photograph by Marie Kennedy. Reprinted with permission.
66. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Collective Violence in European Perspective’’, in Hugh Davis Graham and
Ted Robert Gurr (eds), The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative
Perspectives (New York, 1969), pp. 12–24.
67. Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930
(Cambridge, MA, 1975), pp. 49, 249; Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, pp. 143–146.
256 Marcel van der LindenIn the second half of the 1970s, however, Tilly realized that these
schematas should be discarded. In retrospect, he observed:
[y] a form such as the strike sometimes appeared in all three contexts; the
categories actually described claims, not forms, of action. What is more, the
trio’s teleological tone bothered me, especially when other authors adopted it as
an evolutionary scheme. It sounded suspiciously like modernization theory. The
comparisons that my collaborators and I had undertaken in The Rebellious
Century (1975), in the work on Great Britain I had recently begun, and in the
research on France I was starting to synthesize made the weaknesses of the
tripartite scheme apparent.
68
Dissatisfaction with the classiﬁcation led Tilly – as it previously had
Erving Goffmann – to resort to theatrical metaphors. After all, claimants
resemble actors: they have a limited repertoire (petitions, demonstrations,
etc.), which they perform whenever they wish to present their claims
collectively to the authorities or to opponents. So there are always certain
repertoires of contention comprising several performances each. Reper-
toires may therefore be described as ‘‘the limited, familiar, historically
created arrays of claim-making performances that under most circum-
stances greatly circumscribe the means by which people engage in con-
tentious politics’’.
69 Performances and repertoires are never expressed
solely by the claimants but consistently evolve into a confrontation with
the adversary, the object of the claims. They involve continuous interaction
68. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758–1834’’, in Mark Traugott
(ed.), Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action (Durham [etc.], 1995), pp. 28–29. Frank
Furedi has suggested a different (that is, a dialectical) solution to Tilly’s problem: ‘‘It is
necessary to distinguish between the forces that create the determination to take collective
action and the manner of its articulation. Movements do not evolve in a unilinear direction, and
in Africa as elsewhere widespread national mobilizations may be succeeded by manifestations
of parochial and regional sentiments. More to the point, the distinctions between proactive and
reactive demands may be more apparent than real. Reactive demands in the context of intense
conﬂict often give rise to the formulation of new objectives. Thus squatters defending their
‘traditional rights’ ended up as the most fervent supporters of national freedom during the Mau
Mau revolt’’; Furedi, The Mau Mau War in Perspective (London, 1989), p. 15.
69. Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, p. vii; idem, Popular Contention in Great Britain, pp. 41–48.
Tilly is known to have used the ‘‘repertoire’’ concept by the early 1970s, for example in his essay
about ‘‘The Modernization of Political Conﬂict in France’’, p. 58: ‘‘At any particular time and
place, people have a limited and well-deﬁned repertoire of violent forms. The repertoire
changes systematically with time and place, as the basic forms of organization for nonviolent
action vary.’’ He presented the concept more systematically in ‘‘Getting It Together in Bur-
gundy, 1675–1975’’, Theory and Society, 4 (1977), pp. 479–504, although he retained the com-
petitive, reactive, and proactive categories as well for a few more years; see especially From
Mobilization to Revolution. In his original presentation of the ‘‘repertoire of collective action’’
concept, Tilly assumed that ‘‘a single actor (individual or collective) owned a repertoire of
means and deployed it strategically’’. That was an error and ‘‘a signiﬁcant weakness’’; ‘‘Con-
tentious Repertoires in Great Britain’’, pp. 29–30. He later stressed that repertoires were
interactive.
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology 257between the authorities and the claimants. Assemblies are prohibited,
consultation occurs, demands are presented, borders are explored: in this
respect the repertoire is always the outcome of bargaining. It is plastic and
changes over time.
In one of his ﬁnal books, Contentious Performances (2008), Tilly ela-
borates on this idea, convincingly arguing here that public collective
contention ‘‘overwhelmingly’’ involves ‘‘strong repertoires’’, which means
in part that:
– In particular times and places, performances cluster into a limited number of
recurrent, well-deﬁned types.
– Within the range deﬁned by all contentious actions that a given set of actors
carry on, substantial blanks appear; combinations of actions clearly lying
within the technical reach of participants never occur. As a result, perfor-
mance types have visible boundaries rather than distributing continuously
over the space of technically possible performances.
– For a given set of actors and issues, those performances change relatively
little from one round of action to the next; what happens in one round
of action, furthermore, detectibly constrains what happens in the next
round. [y]
– New performances arise chieﬂy through innovation within existing perfor-
mances, but tend to crystallize, stabilize, and acquire visible boundaries once
they exist.
70
A great many factors inﬂuence the development of performances and
repertoires, such as ‘‘the population’s daily routines and internal organi-
zation (example: the grain seizure depends on the existence of periodic
public markets and on a population that relies on those markets for
survival)’’; ‘‘prevailing standards of rights and justice (example: the ﬁrm-
by-ﬁrm strike depends on the presumption that people have the right to
dispose of their own labor)’’; ‘‘the population’s accumulated experience
with collective action (example: the appearance of the demonstration of a
standard form of contention depends on the discovery that some sorts of
ofﬁcials are more likely than others to listen to demands that have the
visible backing of large numbers of determined people)’’; and ‘‘current
patterns of repression (example: the adoption of the public meeting as a
vehicle for protest depends on the vigor with which the authorities have
been breaking up public meetings)’’.
71
Tilly used his databases to hypothesize that the transition from indirect
to direct rule (1750–1850) coincided with a signiﬁcant shift in the reper-
toire of contention. Until about 1800 the performances were parochial,
70. Tilly, Contentious Performances, pp. 60, 143–144.
71. Tilly, Contentious French, pp. 10, 395–398. To complete the picture, note that protesters
need to keep revising their repertoire to mobilize enough people: continually repeating the
exact same types of action would bore the claimants; Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, p. 41.
258 Marcel van der Lindenparticular, and bifurcated – ‘‘mostly local in scope, adopting forms and
symbols peculiar to the relationship between claimants and the objects of
their claims, either acting directly on a local relationship or asking pri-
vileged intermediaries to convey claims to more distant authorities’’. Such
parochial actions included land invasions, rough music, seizures of grain,
or expulsions of tax collectors. From the nineteenth century onward, the
repertoire gradually became cosmopolitan, autonomous, and modular:
[y] cosmopolitan because both the scope of action and the objects of claims
commonly spanned multiple localities; autonomous because the organizers of
such performances frequently scheduled and located them in advance at their
own initiative rather than taking advantage of authorized assemblies or routine
conﬂuences of people; modular because they employed very similar perfor-
mances across a wide range of issues, groups, localities, and objects of claims.
Examples include public meetings, demonstrations, ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm strikes,
or electoral rallies.
72
Both types of repertoires were effective in the context where they were
used; labelling one backward and the other modern is therefore inap-
propriate. While the old repertoire comprised ephemeral actions, those in
the new repertoire tended to be components of longer-term projects. The
new repertoire marked the rise of national social movements.
73
Tilly long avoided the concept of ‘‘social movements’’ – I suspect that he
adopted the notion only in the 1980s.
74 And only at the start of the twenty-
ﬁrst century did he perfect his own deﬁnition of the term. Tilly believed that
a social movement was a synthesis of three elements. The ﬁrst was a ﬁnite
campaign that connected three parties with one another: the claimants, the
object or objects of the claimants, and the general public. The second con-
sisted of the WUNC displays, meaning that the participants aimed to achieve
Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, and Commitment: they were well-dressed and
were accompanied by dignitaries, clergy, or mothers with children; they
demonstrated their unity through banners, singing, and chanting slogans;
they were as numerous as possible; and they showed their dedication by
72. Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain, p. 349; idem, Contentious French, pp. 390–395;
idem, ‘‘European Violence and Collective Action since 1700’’, Social Research, 53 (1986),
pp. 159–184, 170ff.; idem, Regimes and Repertoires, pp. 51–54. Tilly noted, moreover, that his
dichotomy of repertoires split a continuum in two; Contentious French, p. 394.
73. Tilly believed that the repertoire of the so-called New Social Movements of the last quarter
of the twentieth century differed very little from the older repertoire that had prevailed since
the nineteenth century; Charles Tilly, ‘‘Social Movements, Old and New’’, Research in Social
Movements, Conﬂicts and Change, 10 (1988), pp. 1–18.
74. See e.g. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Britain Creates the Social Movement’’, in James Cronin and Jona-
than Schneer (eds), Social Conﬂict and the Political Order in Modern Britain (London, 1982);
idem, ‘‘Speaking Your Mind Without Elections, Surveys, or Social Movements’’, Public Opinion
Quarterly, 47 (1983), pp. 461–478.
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology 259braving adverse weather, resisting repression, and the like. The third was the
contentious repertoire, as described above.
75
According to Tilly, social movements originated in Britain during the
ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, as a result of wars, parliamentariza-
tion, capitalization, and proletarianization. Wars, as we observed above,
gave the government greater control over the daily lives of the lower
classes and led state agents to try to convince large parts of the population
to support the war effort ﬁnancially or in person. Increasing inﬂuence
from parliaments – the outcome of war efforts ﬁnanced partially through
measures subject to parliamentary approval – made clear to large sections
of the population that these bodies of elected representatives were
important for their existence. The growing signiﬁcance of agrarian,
commercial, and industrial capital reduced the independent inﬂuence of
large landowners. And proletarianization reduced the direct dependence
of the lower classes on certain landlords, masters, and other patrons.
Together, the four elements gave rise to coalitions between different social
groups and caused proletarian and petit-bourgeois activists to stop
allowing the ‘‘short-term effectiveness’’ of collective action to prevail and
to think instead in terms of the ‘‘long-term cumulation of efforts’’.
76
As a consequence of increasingly successful civic claim-making, the
share of non-military state expenditures in the budget grew during the
nineteenth century. Parallel to this process, capitalists and workers alike
managed to embed rights and privileges in the state. ‘‘Establishing the
right to strike, for example, not only deﬁned a number of previously
common worker actions (such as attacks on nonstrikers and scabs) as
illegal, but also made the state the prime adjudicator of that right.’’
77
One aspect of political contention that always interested Tilly
was collective violence, i.e. ‘‘social interaction that immediately inﬂicts
physical damage on persons and/or objects [y.], involves at least two
perpetrators of damage, and results at least in part from coordination
among persons who perform the damaging acts’’.
78 He published on this
75. Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768–2004 (Boulder, CO [etc.], 2004), pp. 3–4; idem,
Regimes and Repertoires, p. 53; idem, Contentious Performances, pp. 118–126. The four
WUNC elements can partially compensate for one another: ‘‘a high value on worthiness can
make up for small numbers. Yet a visibly low value on any one of these elements (a public
demonstration of unworthiness, division, dwindling numbers and/or outright defection) dis-
credits the whole movement’’; Tilly, Durable Inequality, p. 213. In one of his ﬁnal publications
he added a fourth element, namely social movement bases, i.e. ‘‘the organizations, networks,
traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities’’; idem and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious
Politics (Boulder, CO [etc.], 2007), p. 8.
76. Tilly, Popular Contention in Great Britain, p. 364; idem, Social Movements, p. 27.
77. Tilly, ‘‘Futures of European States’’, p. 711.
78. Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, p. 118; idem, Politics of Collective Violence, pp. 3–4.
260 Marcel van der Lindensubject over the course of more than four decades. Tilly consistently argued
that violence was a ‘‘normal’’– albeit not an intrinsically desirable or inevi-
table – aspect of contention: ‘‘violent protests tend to accompany, comple-
ment, and extend organized, peaceful attempts by the same people to
accomplish their objectives’’.
79 After discarding the modernization idea, Tilly
devised a classiﬁcation of forms of collective violence ranging from violent
rituals and coordinated destruction, via brawls to so-called ‘‘opportunistic’’
acts, such as kidnapping, hostage-taking, gang rapes, etc.
80
One far-reaching form of contentious politics that ordinarily coincides
with collective violence is revolution. Tilly’s revolution concept corre-
sponds with Leon Trotsky’s notion of ‘‘dual power’’,
81 although it differs
signiﬁcantly from it as well. Trotsky assumed that two opposing classes
were vying for state control. Tilly believed, however, that this model
contained unnecessary restrictions. There could be more than two blocks,
and these blocks need not consist of only one class but might be based on
class coalitions. This less rigid approach is necessary to label the French,
Mexican, and Chinese revolutions as such.
82 Revolutionary situations
arise when contenders or coalitions of contenders try to seize control of
the state or of part of the state and have the support of a signiﬁcant share
of the population, while the rulers are unable or unwilling to repress or
give in to these contenders.
83
CITIZENSHIP AND DEMOCRATIZATION
From the 1990s onward, Tilly returned to the key theme of his mentor
Barrington Moore, Jr and investigated the circumstances under which
states democratize or de-democratize. At this point he deﬁnitively
broadened his geographic horizon and examined state formation in all
parts of the world, emphasizing contemporary affairs far more than he
had done previously. Tilly’s earlier studies on French and British history
had made clear to him that contentious politics changed the form of states.
79. Tilly, ‘‘Collective Violence in European Perspective’’, pp. 5, 10, and 43–44.
80. Tilly, Politics of Collective Violence, p. 131. Politics of Collective Violence features a lengthy
reconstruction of the forms of collective violence listed here. Tilly regarded terror not as a
single form of violence but as a strategy: ‘‘deployment of violence or threats of violence against
a very unequal target’’; Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, p. 138. The inequality may mean that the
perpetrator of the violence is much stronger than the victim (e.g. state terror) or in fact much
weaker; Charles Tilly, ‘‘Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists’’, Sociological Theory, 22 (2004), pp. 5–13
(also in idem, Explaining Social Processes (Boulder, Co, 2008)); idem, ‘‘Terror as Strategy and
Relational Process’’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 46 (2005), pp. 11–32.
81. Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, Max Eastman (trans.) (London,
1932), ch. 11.
82. Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, p. 191.
83. Tilly, European Revolutions, pp. 241–242.
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struggles between popular groups and ruling elites had led to ‘‘parlia-
mentarization’’ of the national state and had given rise to the national social
movement. This change also brought about a new connection between local
and national levels – namely citizenship. In one of his last works Tilly
deﬁned citizenship as ‘‘mutual rights and obligations directly binding gov-
ernmental agents to whole categories of persons deﬁned by their relation-
ship to the government in question’’. Citizenship therefore exists only if
‘‘governmental capacity is relatively extensive, rights extend to some sig-
niﬁcant share of a government’s subject population, some equality of access
to government exists among political participants, consultation of political
participants makes a difference to governmental performance, and political
participants enjoy some protection from arbitrary action’’.
84
Citizenship is a necessary but not an adequate condition for parliamen-
tary democracy. In a programmatic text from 1995, entitled ‘‘Democracy is
a Lake’’, Tilly observed that the rise of citizenship made democracy ‘‘an
option’’ but not ‘‘a necessity’’.
85 After all, modern dictatorships such as
National Socialism and Stalinism provided for fairly broad and equal citi-
zenship. Democracy is a speciﬁc form of citizenship that provides citizens
with considerable protection from arbitrary acts by the state and involves
mutually binding consultation: state agents fulﬁl the wishes of the popu-
lation, and the population observes the corresponding rules drafted by the
state agents. A regime therefore becomes more democratic, when: (1) a
larger share of the population, (2) is consulted on a more equal basis, and (3)
is more protected from the state’s arbitrary action, while (4) the state agents
and the population pay more attention to one another. As the state increases
its ‘‘capacity’’, it becomes better able to promote democracy. A regime can
therefore be democratic only once the state can enforce its decisions.
86 Of
course high capacity does not guarantee that a state will be democratic; high
capacity is obviously compatible with a dictatorship as well.
The question that truly preoccupied Tilly was which circumstances
promoted, or in fact obstructed, democratization. He understood that
social movements as such did not inevitably result in democracy; after
all, they could also pursue social inequality and exclusion, as did racist
84. Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, p. 24. Cf. the previous description of citizenship as ‘‘a
continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in which each has
enforceable rights and obligations uniquely by virtue of (1) the person’s membership in an
exclusive category, the native-born plus the naturalized and (2) the agent’s relation to the state
rather than any other authority the agent may enjoy’’; Charles Tilly, ‘‘Citizenship, Identity and
Social History’’, International Review of Social History, Supplement 3 (1995), pp. 1–17, 8.
85. Tilly, ‘‘Democracy is a Lake’’, p. 376.
86. Charles Tilly, Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000 (Cambridge, 2004),
pp. 13–14; idem, Democracy (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 14–16.
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87 Conversely, democracies might come about without
social movements, as became clear, following the Allied occupations of
Germany and Japan in 1945.
88 In the course of his quest for an answer,
Tilly ultimately realized that formulating sufﬁcient conditions for
democratization and de-democratization was impossible, although pro-
cesses that promoted or obstructed democratization were identiﬁable.
Three types of changes promoted democratization in Tilly’s view. First,
existing trust networks (trading diasporas, kinship groups, religious com-
munities, etc.) should not remain aloof from the state but should integrate
signiﬁcantly into the regime to get their members to engage in mutually
binding consultation. Second, categorical inequality – distribution of the
population into different groups with collectively diverging life opportu-
nities, depending on social class, gender, race, caste, ethnicity, religion, or
nationality – is not translated directly into categorical differences in political
rights and obligations: severe social inequality will not intrinsically impede
democracy, provided that citizens have basically the same political rights.
And third, autonomous power clusters, especially those with concentrated
coercive means need to be placed under the aegis of public politics and
become part of regular citizen–state interactions.
89
– Trust networks
90 are not intrinsically conducive to democratization; in
numerous cases they have in fact obstructed democracy.
91 What matters
is that trust networks are integrated in the state, either directly (e.g. via
social security systems) or indirectly (e.g. via trade unions, churches).
– Tilly interpreted categorical inequality as comprising dual inequalities,
such as those between black and white, male and female, citizen and non-
citizen, etc. Such inequalities mean that one category has far less access
than the opposite category to certain resources (e.g. coercive means, skills,
87. While social movements promote democratization only under certain conditions, the
reverse correlation is much stronger: democratization promotes social movements, even though
it is an ‘‘incomplete correspondence’’; Tilly, Social Movements, p. 126.
88. Tilly, Social Movements, pp. 56–59; Charles Tilly, ‘‘When Do (and Don’t) Social Movements
Promote Democratization?’’, in Pedro Ibarra (ed.), Social Movements and Democracy (New York,
2003).
89. Tilly, Democracy, pp. 74–76.
90. Trust networks consist of ‘‘ramiﬁed interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties,
within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the
malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others’’; Tilly, Trust and Rule,p .1 2 ;idem, Democracy,p .8 1 .
91. Tilly was therefore highly critical of the work of Robert Putnam, who made the blanket
assumption that trust networks were important for democratization in all cases. Putnam equates not
only effective and democratic institutions with one another, but also organizations, social capital
and trust networks. ‘‘At best, then, we can draw from Putnam’s analysis a much more modest
conclusion: within already relatively democratic regimes, people who engage in civic organizations
[y] are more likely to meet their collective obligations, to press for better government perfor-
mance, and to trust their fellow citizens’’; Tilly, Trust and Rule,p .1 3 3 ;idem, Democracy,p .9 2 .
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology 263animals, land, machines, ﬁnancial capital, information, media, knowledge).
Two mechanisms engender such inequalities, namely Marxian exploitation
and Weberian opportunity-hoarding. Exploitation means that members of
a categorically bounded network appropriate resources generated entirely
or in part by others, for which these others are not compensated for the
full value added. Opportunity hoarding occurs when members of a
categorically bounded network monopolize a valuable resource that
reinforces the network. Such inequalities become durable when
transactions across a categorical boundary (e.g. black–white) regularly
beneﬁt one of both sides, and the boundary is reproduced.
Categorical inequality (in the sense of sustained differences in advantages
by property ownership, religion, gender, or race, etc.) is not ordinarily
created deliberately from the outset. It is more likely to come about as
follows. First, people try to appropriate certain resources through
exploitation or opportunity-hoarding. If they succeed, the resulting
inequality needs to be consolidated; this requires distinguishing insiders
from outsiders, monopolizing knowledge and power, and ensuring loyalty
and succession. All this may be achieved by establishing categorical
boundaries. Democracy only becomes possible, when categorical inequality
becomes insulated from public politics: ‘‘Democracy can form and survive
so long as public politics itself does not divide sharply at the boundaries of
unequal categories. Conversely, political rights, obligations, and involve-
ments that divide precisely at categorical boundaries threaten democracy
and inhibit democratization.’’ Here lies an important reason for the ‘‘natural
afﬁnity’’ between democracy and advanced capitalism. The cause is not
the ‘‘ideological compatibility of democracy and free enterprise’’, but rather
that fully ﬂedged capitalist states do not require categorical inequality to
exist. After all, it makes no material difference whether such states obtain
their ﬁnancing from a small group of capitalists or from a large group of
taxpayers. Because economic growth has led to a situation where ‘‘citizens,
workers, and consumers coincide’’, democracy becomes a realistic option.
92
– Autonomous power clusters on the territory of a regime may operate
within the state (e.g. army ofﬁcers) or outside (e.g. war lords). Reducing




In addition to being exceptionally proliﬁc, Charles Tilly supervised
hundreds of Ph.D. theses and inﬂuenced a broad circle of researchers
92. Tilly, Democracy, pp. 115–118, quotations from pp. 115 and 118.
93. Ibid., pp. 137–139.
264 Marcel van der Lindenfrom Spain and the Netherlands to Japan and China, thanks to the many
translated editions of his publications. Both sociologists and political
scientists, as well as historians, ﬁnd him inspiring. At the same time,
Tilly’s approach has met with profound reservations, especially among
historians. His studies are often considered encouraging, but in many
cases also diagrammatic and overly simplistic.
These doubts are attributable in part to Tilly’s intellectual stand. As we
saw, he was inclined to embrace a form of historical materialism, although
at heart he was a radical-democratic pragmatist, somewhat similar to John
Figure 2. Schematic summary of Tilly’s view on European history, 1500–2000.
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology 265Dewey. Tilly believed that politics was about defending and promoting
civil rights.
94 Epistemologically, he cared mainly whether his intellectual
constructs ‘‘worked’’, meaning whether they did what they were supposed
to do: ‘‘Theories are tool kits, varying in their range and effectiveness but
proposing solutions to recurrent explanatory problems.’’
95 The tool-kit
vision leads to a certain philosophical superﬁciality, as well as to lenience
with respect to concepts and hypotheses. If a classiﬁcation or suspicion
proves unfounded, it is no tragedy but does call for a better solution.
This pragmatism has signiﬁcant shortcomings. This is already clear
from the most primary ‘‘tools’’ that researchers use, namely their deﬁni-
tions. Over time, Tilly has provided many dozens of deﬁnitions of
processes, institutions, and events, all attuned to the limited historical
and geographical framework within which he wished to apply them. A
deﬁnition that ‘‘works’’ in time frame T1 in region R1, however, may
prove ineffective in a different time frame T2 or a different region R2 and
may as a consequence complicate studying a change (T1-T2), as well
as comparison with a different region (R12R2). His description of states
as ‘‘coercion wielding entities’’, for example, reduces the core tasks
of public authorities to domestic repression and international warfare.
In Europe this is most applicable for the early modern period, but it is less
meaningful for later periods, when national states appeared ‘‘as school-
teachers, social workers, bus drivers, refuse collectors, and a host of other
guises’’.
96
Even within a certain context (T1,R 1), Tilly was at times inclined to
narrow his scope. When he discussed the economy, he was referring pri-
marily to merchant and industrial capital, often, although not in all cases,
neglecting the interests of large landowners, small farmers, etc. William
McNeill noted that ‘‘agricultural differences are entirely absent from his
[Tilly’s] purview’’, even though ‘‘until very recently the great majority of
Europeans lived on the land; and differences in the techniques of cultivation,
property law, and harvest results probably had more to do with European
94. Perhaps this related to Tilly’s tendency to attribute citizenship primarily or exclusively to
protests ‘‘from below’’ and to acknowledge only the advantages. Samuel Clark has rightly
asserted on the one hand that ‘‘national citizenship was actually initiated by absolutist regimes
before the emergence of the popular movements to which Tilly and others credit it’’, and on the
other hand that ‘‘citizenship has two sides, an inclusionary side and an exclusionary side’’;
Clark, ‘‘Amending the Whig Interpretation of Citizenship’’, Contemporary Sociology, 31 (2002),
pp. 382–385, 383–384.
95. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Sociology, Meet History’’, in idem, As Sociology Meets History, p. 11.
The tool-kit analogy ﬁgures prominently in Arthur Stinchcombe’s book, Constructing Social
Theories (New York, 1968), which Tilly deeply admired.
96. Michael Mann, Review of Tilly’s Coercion, Capital and European States, American Journal
of Sociology, 96 (1991), pp. 1260–1261. See also Anton Schuurman, ‘‘Mensen maken verschil’’,
Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis, 22 (1996), pp. 168–204, 198.
266 Marcel van der Lindenstate-building than commercial capital and cities did’’.
97 This shortcoming
appears to apply to much of Tilly’s oeuvre, although there are some
exceptions.
98 Likewise, Tilly’s deﬁnition of capital as ‘‘any tangible mobile
resources, and enforceable claims on such resources’’ is so broad that dif-
ferences between contexts (T1,R 12T2,R 2) become invisible.
99 Christo-
pher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall have responded: ‘‘By this deﬁnition
a Nuer headman’s cows are capital.’’ Tilly seems to confuse accumulation as
such with capitalist accumulation: ‘‘The storing of yams by a Trobriand chief
is not capitalist accumulation. Neither is the hoarding of treasure in temples
or cathedrals.’’
100 Due in part to this overly broad perception of capitalism,
Tilly is unable to acknowledge a transition from pre-capitalist relationships
to a capitalist world system, rendering his reconstruction of European
developments fundamentally biased: ‘‘Rather than positing a major trans-
formation of the mode of production (a concept which Tilly does not
employ) during the period he is studying, Tilly maps out the different paths
by which European states increased their powers over domestic groups.’’
101
Based on his deﬁnitions, Tilly aimed to perform a ‘‘neat’’ analysis of
‘‘untidy’’ processes.
102 In the complex and chaotic reality, he tried to
identify essential causal patterns that perhaps did not explain this whole
reality but did account for a characteristic feature of it. Accordingly, he
reduced a major share of European history since 1500 to two processes
(capital-formation and state-building), which he tried to use to explain
as many other phenomena as possible. To my knowledge, not even
Tilly’s harshest critics ever disputed that Tilly achieved a lot this way. He
presented several insights and hypotheses that advanced historical
research, including some about the relationship between state-building
and claim-making, changing repertoires of contention, and the causes of
democratization and de-democratization.
The method therefore has merit.
103 Note, however, that Tilly did not
apply it equitably in all cases. He paid far more attention to state-building
97. William H. McNeill, Review of Tilly’s Coercion, Capital, and European States, Journal of
Modern History, 64 (1992), pp. 583–584, 584.
98. See especially Tilly, The Contentious French.
99. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, p. 17; idem, Democracy, p. 87.
100. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, ‘‘World-Systems and Modes of Produc-
tion: Toward the Comparative Study of Transformations’’, Humboldt Journal of Social Rela-
tions, 18 (1992), pp. 81–117, 104–105.
101. Ibid.
102. Charles Tilly, ‘‘Neat Analyses of Untidy Processes’’, International Labor and Working-
Class History, 27 (1985), pp. 4–19.
103. We need to beware, of course, of abstractions that misrepresent historical truth. Tony Judt
mentioned this thirty years ago in a vitriolic attack: ‘‘In The Rebellious Century he [Tilly]
acknowledges that his graphs make 1871 look rather insigniﬁcant in the history of protest in
France. This, he concedes, may arise from ‘our procedures’. He then goes on to claim that, since
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology 267than to capital-formation. As a result, important aspects of the trends
reviewed received insufﬁcient consideration in his analyses. French historian
Heinz-Gerhard Haupt observed, for example, that the ﬁxation on the state
monopoly on violence and disregard for the class differentiation that coin-
cided with the rise of capitalism is an obstacle to understanding ‘‘that neither
village-level conﬂicts nor opposition to state ﬁscal policy dominated in the
Ancien Re ´gime. Instead, parallel to consolidating the absolute monarchy,
violent clashes that pitched farmers against bourgeois or aristocratic
landowners over the use of the commons prevailed.’’ The consequences of
capitalist accumulation for class relationships ‘‘fade’’, and the structural
violence embedded in economic relationships is overlooked, i.e. the violence
contained in socio-economic relationships that produces ‘‘cumulatively dis-
advantageous inequality, which penetrates public awareness depending on
the state of the economy and is contested in class conﬂicts’’.
104
The second problem with Tilly’s dual-process model is the structuralist
interpretation of capital-formation, state-building, and derivative develop-
ments. Even though Tilly may have intended otherwise, contingency hardly
ﬁgures in his analyses. Despite his relational approach moreover, he ordi-
narily appears to view individual operators or social groups, merely as
character masks – puppets that simply will not come to life.
105 This some-
what mechanistic approach leaves courses of events devoid of dialectics.
Barbara Laslett’s observations about Durable Inequality hold true for many
of his other writings as well: ‘‘There are no contradictions for Tilly, no
dynamics of change that are internal to his model or vary by the speciﬁc
historical conditions that one is attempting to analyze.’’ As a consequence,
‘‘the actor – the human agent – is lost from sight’’. And because the actors are
lacking, ‘‘consciousness and intention is, at most, incidental and ephemeral in
his model’’.
106 This ‘‘structural overstretch’’ is clear from Tilly’s use of the
mechanism concept since the 1990s. On this subject Dilip Simeon has rightly
remarked that: ‘‘the use of mechanical metaphors is apposite, as long as we
remember that they are metaphors’’. But, ‘‘no social-scientiﬁc machinery,
these ‘procedures’ were used consistently for the period 1830 through the mid-twentieth
century, ‘we have little choice but to treat 1870–71 as a doubtful case in the correlation between
extent of violence and extent of political change’. When a historian’s ‘procedures’ take over in
this way, one cannot help wondering just what, or who, is the doubtful case’’; Tony Judt, ‘‘A
Clown in Regal Purple: Social History and the Historians’’, History Workshop Journal, 7 (1979),
pp. 66–94, 76. Judt’s references are to Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, Rebellious Century, p. 60.
104. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, ‘‘Zur historischen Analyse von Gewalt’’, Geschichte und Gesell-
schaft, 3 (1977), pp. 236–256, 247, 250, 251.
105. Margaret Levi, ‘‘Bringing Pinocchio to Life’’, Contemporary Sociology, 14 (1985),
pp. 693–695. Whether Levi’s alternative (methodological individualism) is superior to Tilly’s
approach is a matter of opinion.
106. Barbara Laslett, ‘‘The Poverty of (Monocausal) Theory: A Comment on Charles Tilly’s
Durable Inequality’’, Comparative Studies of Society and History, 42 (2000), pp. 475–481, 475–476.
268 Marcel van der Lindenhowever sophisticated, can provide a satisfactory explanatory account for
such historical events as the role of Gandhi in the communal politics that
unfolded in Calcutta during 1946–1948 or that of Lenin in revolutionary
Russia between April and October 1917’’.
107
A deterministic and unilinear historical perspective is a factor here.
William Sewell has observed that in Tilly’s view human intervention may
at best delay historically inevitable processes but cannot stop them.
Thus for Tilly, even the most spectacular outbursts of collective violence such as
those that took place during the [French] Revolutions of 1789 and 1848 do not
actually change the course of history. Collective action is merely an effect or a
symptom of deeper causes. The course of history is determined by anonymous
sociological processes operating behind or beneath the frenetic struggles and
contentions that Tilly actually describes in his articles and books.
108
Such unilinearism will quickly lead to Eurocentrism. Even though Tilly
regularly expressed interest in developments outside the North Atlantic
region, he took historical experiences outside this area less seriously than
he might have.
109 Based in part on Popular Contention in Great Britain,
Jose ´ Antonio Lucero remarked:
While Tilly is very far from being a vulgar modernization theorist, Great Britain
comes close to seeming like the original crucible in which national states, social
movements, and modern citizenship were forged. [y] Such statements can not
107. Dilip Simeon, ‘‘A Uniﬁed Field Theory for Contention?’’, International Review of Social
History, 49 (2004), pp. 115–121, 116. Tilly responded to this criticism by asserting that Simeon
‘‘wavers between two contradictory positions’’: on the one hand he wants general explanations,
but on the other hand he considers some phenomena to be inexplicable; Charles Tilly,
‘‘Rhetoric, Social History, and Contentious Politics: Reply to Critics’’, International Review of
Social History, 49 (2004), pp. 132141, 134–135. Simeon’s point, however, was that some courses
of events could be explained by mechanisms, but that others could not. He did not claim that
the latter series of phenomena was inexplicable, merely that it required a different explanation.
Additionally, Tilly regularly listed mechanisms in his late oeuvre (e.g. in Contention and
Democracy in Europe, pp. 18–20; Trust and Rule, p. 73; Democracy, p.119) but long refrained from
elucidating their speciﬁc effect. On this subject, see also Zenonas Norkus, ‘‘Mechanisms as Miracle
Makers? The Rise and Inconsistencies of the ‘Mechanismic Approach’ in Social Science and
History’’, History and Theory, 44 (2005), pp. 348–372, 368. Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics,
p. xi, admitting that earlier publications (especially Dynamics of Contention) summed up all kinds
of mechanisms, ‘‘without deﬁning and documenting them carefully, much less showing exactly how
they worked’’; Contentious Politics, pp. 29, 92–94, 207, 214–215, tried to accommodate this critique.
108. Sewell, ‘‘Collective Violence and Collective Loyalties in France’’, p. 533; see also idem,
Logics of History. Social Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago, IL [etc.], 2005), pp. 88–91.
109. See e.g. Tilly, ‘‘Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation’’, p. 637;
idem, ‘‘The Geography of European Statemaking’’, pp. 174–178; idem and Eiko Ikegami, ‘‘State
Formation and Contention in Japan and France’’, in James L. McClain, John M. Merriman, and
Ugawa Kaoru (eds), Edo and Paris: Urban Life and the State in the Early Modern Era (Ithaca, NY,
1994); Charles Tilly, ‘‘Contention and the Urban Poor in Latin America’’, in Silvia Arrom and
Servando Ortoll (eds), Riots in the Cities: Popular Politics and the Urban Poor in Latin America,
1765–1910 (New York, 1996); idem, Contention and Democracy in Europe, pp. 243–259.
Charles Tilly’s Historical Sociology 269be proven until the histories of collective action in Latin America, Africa, and
elsewhere are written. I do not suggest that ‘‘the social movement’’ actually
originated in eighteenth century Peru or that the British experience is unim-
portant for other parts of the world. Rather, I urge only that [y] we worry
more about the particular histories of collective action in places like Peru and
engage in more broadly comparative analysis on colonial and postcolonial
states. Otherwise, the logic of ‘‘modular forms of collective action’’ crowds out
alternative etiologies and histories.
110
Comparing experiences in the North Atlantic with those in other parts of
the world suggests that the state-formation logic that Tilly postulated was
based on presumptions not made explicit.
111
Over time, Tilly apparently felt a need to reﬁne and expand his historical
model,
112 especially when he started to introduce cultural aspects that he
had overlooked in the past. In his ﬁrst book, The Vende ´e, he discussed
a rebellion, devoting less than one page to Catholicism, even though
110. Jose ´ Antonio Lucero, ‘‘On Feuds, Tumults, and Turns: Politics and Culture in Social
Movement and Theory’’, Comparative Politics, 32 (1999–2000), pp. 231–249, 234. Samuel Clark
argues that Tilly’s interpretation of citizenship as a relation between persons and state agents is
Eurocentric as well: ‘‘Certainly to try to understand Medieval and Early-modern urban citi-
zenship as the relationship of people to state agents is only to handicap us. Taking Tilly’s
deﬁnition to other parts of the world would be even more debilitating’’; Samuel Clark,
‘‘Amending the Whig Interpretation of Citizenship’’, p. 384.
111. Miguel Angel Centeno, for example, contrasted Europe with nineteenth-century Latin
America and demonstrated that wars can be made ‘‘productive’’ for state formation only if three
conditions are met. First, states have to obtain the money required for warfare exclusively via
domestic mobilization of resources. In other words, they may not solve their ﬁnancial problems by
printing more money, taking out foreign loans, obtaining revenues from customs duties, etc. This
will work only if enough money is available domestically (from tax revenues), which will be the
case only if taxable consumption by the population is sufﬁcient, quantiﬁable, taxable wage labour is
relatively abundant, and/or there is a wealthy, landed oligarchy that has extractable sources. Second,
the state requires an administrative apparatus adequate for managing rapid increases in revenues and
expenditures. This is far from obvious, as became apparent, for example, when the Brazilian
government was unable to conduct a census in 1851–1852. And ﬁnally, the central state ‘‘must have
already established sovereignty over its territory and must be supported by enough local leaders as
to make domestic extraction proﬁtable’’. In other words, ‘‘the willingness of the population to
accept these burdens’’ is primordial, as ‘‘state capacity is not an absolute phenomenon but a rela-
tional one’’. In nineteenth-century Latin America, ‘‘the relevant elites did not see the wars as
threatening their social positions and thus did not have the incentive to permit greater political
penetration’’; Miguel Angel Centeno, ‘‘Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century
Latin America’’, American Journal of Sociology, 102 (1997), pp. 1565–1605, 1569, 1570, 1584, 1590,
1594.
112. Ongoing elaboration of an initially simple model was also the approach taken by the
Norwegian political scientist, Stein Rokkan, whom Tilly greatly admired. See e.g. Charles Tilly,
‘‘Stein Rokkans begrepsmessige kart over Europa’’, in Bernt Hagtvet (ed.), Politikk mellom
økonomi og kultur: Stein Rokkan som politisk sosiolog og forskningsinspirator (Oslo, 1992);
idem, ‘‘Stein Rokkan et les identite ´s politiques’’, Revue international de politique compare ´,2
(1995), pp. 27–45.
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113 One sign of the change in Tilly’s position
was when he introduced the ‘‘contentious-repertoire’’ concept, presented
commitment as a work incentive (in addition to compensation and
coercion), and started to view trust networks as a precondition for
democracy. Still, Tilly never expanded his model consistently to reﬂect
this change. His entire macro-analysis continued to revolve around capital
and coercion. Adding culture as a third macro-category at some point
would have been logical, but Tilly never took this step.
114 Although we
can only speculate about the reasons, complete integration of cultural
elements would presumably have compelled Tilly to discard his struc-
turalism as well and to transform his explanatory model in addition to
expanding it. Anthony Smith, for example, has argued that had Tilly not
neglected the ethnic aspect, his state formation theory would have
appeared in an entirely different light; after all:
[y] if political leaders wish to create states and form nations under the
appropriate social and technological conditions, they can only do so if the ethnic
conditions are similarly favorable; and the more appropriate those ethnic con-
ditions, the more likely are they to succeed in creating both states and
nations.
115
Many aspects of Tilly’s oeuvre are undoubtedly subject to criticism.
Nonetheless, Tilly’s ‘‘sociology of the long pull’’ has demonstrated how
useful focusing on a few basic long-term processes can be:
116 con-
centrating on a select number of essential trends facilitates a better
understanding of the complex reality. At the same time, the points of
criticism reviewed above make clear that parts of Tilly’s model merit
revision in the future, so that it may be embedded in a broader analysis
that accounts not only for the North Atlantic region but for the world
as a whole and consequently reﬂects greater consideration for capital-
formation, culture, and the non-coercive aspects of state intervention.
113. Sewell, ‘‘Collective Violence and Collective Loyalties in France’’, p. 532.
114. On this subject, see also Patrice Mann, ‘‘L’E ´tat, l’action collective et l’histoire’’, Revue
Franc ¸aise de Sociologie, 26 (1985), pp. 695–712, 700.
115. Anthony D Smith, ‘‘State-Making and Nation-Building’’, in John A. Hall (ed.), States in
History (Oxford [etc.], 1989), pp. 244 (quotation) and 252. ‘‘Thus, prior to 1800, states and
nations were created in tandem in limited areas of Europe and Japan, on the basis of prior
dominant ethnie. After 1800 but before 1914, states were created, and later nations, on the basis
of prior ethnie which sought to turn themselves into states and then nations. This was the classic
era of self-determination, i.e. ethnic self-transformation, in Eastern Europe. Between 1914 and
1945, we ﬁnd the apogee of national assimilation of immigrants to states which until the late
nineteenth century had been based on fairly small settler communities. [...] Finally, after 1945,
the imposed alien state evokes an elite nationalism based on artiﬁcially constructed boundaries
and territories’’ (p. 242).
116. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, ‘‘Tilly on the Past as a Sequence of Futures’’, in Charles Tilly,
Roads from Past to Future (Lanham, MD, 1997), p. 406.
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